Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

1989

Cheryl Hardy v. The Prudential Insurance
Compnay of America; Wayne L. Rigby, Insurance
Agent : Reply Brief
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Philip R. Fishler, Stephen J. Trayner; Strong and Hanni; Richard B. Ferrari; King and Ballow;
attorneys for respondents.
Brinton R. Burbidge, Merrill F. Nelson; Kirton and McConkie and Poelman; attorneys for appellant.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Hardy v. Prudential Insurance, No. 890483.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1989).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/2757

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

D (CI'MFNT
K'r

45.9
.S9

DOCKET NO.

BRIEF.

mi%>

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

CHERYL HARDY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
Case No. 890483
vs.

Priority No. 5

THE PRUDENTIAL INSURANCE
COMPANY OF AMERICA;
WAYNE L. RIGBY,
Insurance Agent,
Defendants-Respondents.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

APPEAL FROM INTERLOCUTORY ORDER OF THE THIRD DISTRICT
COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, JUDGE RICHARD H. MOFFAT

Philip R. Fishier, No. 1083
Stephen J. Trayner, No. 4928
STRONG & HANNI
9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

Brinton R. Burbidge, No. 0491
Merrill F. Nelson, No. 3841
KIRTON, McCONKIE & POELMAN
1800 Eagle Gate Tower
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1104

Richard B. Ferrari, No. 1064
KING & BALLOW
350 West Ash Street, Suite 750
San Diego, California 92101

Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant

Attorneys for Defendants-Respondents

FILED
0CY \ 7 1990
Clerk, Supreme Court, Utah

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

CHERYL HARDY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
Case No. 890483
vs.

Priority No. 5

THE PRUDENTIAL INSURANCE
COMPANY OF AMERICA;
WAYNE L. RIGBY,
Insurance Agent,
Defendants-Respondents.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

APPEAL FROM INTERLOCUTORY ORDER OF THE THIRD DISTRICT
COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, JUDGE RICHARD H. MOFFAT
Philip R. Fishier, No. 1083
Stephen J. Trayner, No. 4928
STRONG & HANNI
9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

Brinton R. Burbidge, No. 0491
Merrill F. Nelson, No. 3841
KIRTON, McCONKIE & POELMAN
1800 Eagle Gate Tower
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1104

Richard B. Ferrari, No. 1064
KING & BALLOW
350 West Ash Street, Suite 750
San Diego, California 92101

Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant

Attorneys for Defendants-Respondents

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORnTES

ii

INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT

1

REPLY TO DEFENDANTS' STATEMENTS OF FACT

2

A.

Defendants' Statement

2

B.

Response to Plaintiffs Statement

9

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

11

ARGUMENT
POINT I:
THE
DISQUALIFICATION
ORDER
CONSTITUTES
REVERSIBLE ERROR UNDER BOTH ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AND CORRECTION OF ERROR STANDARDS OF REVIEW. . .

13

A.
B.
POINT II:

Abuse of Discretion
Correction of Error

13
13
15

THE REPORTING OF MR. FERRARI'S CONDUCT TO THE
CALIFORNIA BAR WAS LAWFUL AND PROPER

16

POINT III: CONSIDERATIONS OF RELATIVE PREJUDICE AND
HARDSHIP TO THE PARTIES REQUIRE REVERSAL OF THE
DISQUALIFICATION ORDER

17

POINT IV: THE RULE OF ABSOLUTE PRIVILEGE FOR REPORTS OF
LAWYER MISCONDUCT APPLIES TO THE PRESENT CASE. .

19

POINT V:

DISQUALIFICATION VIOLATES THE DUE PROCESS RIGHTS
OF PLAINTIFF AND HER COUNSEL

CONCLUSION

20
21

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases

Page

Anderson v. Utah County Bd. of County Commissioners,
589 P.2d 1214 (Utah 1979)

18

Bodily v. Intermountain Health Care Corp.,
649 F. Supp. 468 (D. Utah 1986)

18

Bufalino v. Teller,
209 F. Supp. 866 (D. Pa. 1962)

17

Cheng v. GAF Corp.,
713 F.2d 886 (2nd Cir. 1983)

20

Coggle v. Snow,
56 Wash. App. 499, 784 P.2d 554 (1990)

14

Dietrich Corp. v. King Resources Co.,
596 F.2d 422 (10th Cir. 1979)

21

In re Adoption of Infant Anonymous,
760 P.2d 916 (Utah App. 1988)

3, 16

In re Murphy,
560 F.2d 326 (8th Cir. 1977)

21

Margulies v. Upchurch,
696 P.2d 1195 (Utah 1985)

13, 14, 19

People v. Kinder,
122 Cal. App. 2d 457, 265 P.2d 24 (1954)

3, 16

Tester v. Tester,
123 Ariz. 41, 597 P.2d 194 (App. 1979)

18

Western Kane County Spec. Serv. Dist. v. Jackson Cattle Co.,
744 P.2d 1376 (Utah 1987)

14

Wiener v. Weintraub,
22 N.Y.2d 330, 239 N.E.2d 540 (1968)

17

ii

Statutes and Rules
California Rules of Professional Conduct
Rule 1-400(D)

5, 11

Procedures of Discipline of the Utah State Bar
Rule VIII(c)

19

Utah Rules of Evidence
Rule 201
Rule 603

19
3

Utah Rules of Professional Conduct
Rule 8.3(a)

19

iii

INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT
The central issue in this appeal is whether plaintiffs counsel may properly be
disqualified solely for reporting to the California Bar that defendants' counsel, Richard
Ferrari, was listing his name on California legal documents, with a California law firm and
California address, without disclaiming membership in the California Bar. The Brief of
Appellant demonstrated that the challenged report was justified, even required, by relevant
law and ethical obligations; that the report caused no prejudice to defendants, the
proceeding, or Mr. Ferrari; and that the report was absolutely privileged under ethical
rules and the common law. Because the report had no impact on the litigants or the
proceeding, Mr. Ferrari's proper recourse was to refer the matter to bar officials or to file
an independent action.1
Plaintiff issued an open challenge to defendants in her Brief of Appellant, asserting
unequivocally that no prior case in this country had upheld disqualification of counsel
solely for reporting the possible ethical violation of opposing counsel, or for conduct
prejudicial solely to a party's counsel.

(Br. of App. at 12-13, 21.)

Respondents fails to cite any such case. There is none.

The Brief of

There is no legal support

whatsoever for the disqualification order in this case.2

1

Defendants repeatedly characterize the report to the California Bar as accusing Ferrari of criminal conduct and as
therefore constituting "malicious defamation" or "libel" under Calilornia law. (Br. of Resp. at 17, 35-36.) They ignore the
fact that the California Bar, after warning Mr. Ferrari, considered the matter "closed" (Br. of App., Add 54) In any
event, if Mr. Ferrari felt accused of criminal conduct, then referral of the matter to Bar officials or commencement of an
independent action would have been much more appropriate than a motion to disqualify counsel in a case unalfected by
the report
2
Defendants falsely state that "plaintiffs Brief nowhere contends that the Order was entered without any sound basis"
(Br. of Resp. at 3.) To the contrary, absence of legal grounds for the order was the entire focus of plaintiffs brief (See
Br. of App, Point I.A., at 12-20.)

It is understandable, then, why only one-fourth of defendants' 41-page brief is devoted to
discussion of the law, usually with little or no authority. The remainder of the brief
contains only a redundant manipulation of the facts, with frequent erroneous citations to
the record.
There is no legally sufficient basis for disqualification on the settled facts before the
Court; accordingly, the disqualification order must be reversed.
REPLY TO DEFENDANTS' STATEMENTS OF FACT
A.

Defendants' Statement
The caustic, cynical, and accusatory tone of defendants' statement of facts obscures

the truth and disserves the appellate process. A correction of certain misstatements of
fact and identification of unsupported assertions is necessary to accurate appellate review.3
Most of defendants' assertions pertaining to Ferrari's procurement of the Bernstein
subpoena are either unsupported or supported only by references to arguments of counsel
on the motion to disqualify. For example, the assertion that Stephen Trayner obtained
a commission for the Bernstein deposition is supported only by a reference to the
commission itself, which does not say who obtained it.

(Br. of Resp. at 10.)

The

assertions that Trayner sent the commission to Ferrari and that Ferrari forwarded it to the

3

The first five pages of defendants' statement of facts (Br of Resp at 5-9) contain information that is wholly
immaterial, however, correction of erroneous or incomplete information is necessary to prevent distortion of the record
I or example, plaintiff did not "refuse[ ] to cooperate in drafting a pretrial order" (Br of Resp at 7 ) Plaintiff simply
did not agree with defendants' proposed pretrial order and, accordingly, submitted an alternative proposed order (See
R 1479) Plaintiff is not in default on defendants' counterclaim (Br of Resp at 8) because the district court has not yet
entered an order granting leave to file the proposed Third Amended Complaint Defendants must have realized that their
counterclaim was premature or they certainly would have filed a default certificate Regarding the depositions of
defendants' proposed witnesses (Br of Resp at 8-9), nearly half of those witnesses have depositions or affidavits already
on record, several other witnesses are so minor that they need not be deposed at all, and depositions of the remaining few
witnesses were being arranged when the disqualification motion was filed Contrary to defendants' assessment (Br of Resp
at 9), the case was close to trial

2

law firm of Henderson & Angle for execution and service are supported only by a
reference to Ferrari's argument at the hearing, which covers only the latter assertion. (Br.
of Resp. at 10-11.) The record contains no affidavit or testimony from Trayner or anyone
at Henderson & Angle. Moreover, as defendants must know, mere arguments of counsel
do not constitute evidence.

See Rule 603, Utah R. Evid.; In re Adoption of Infant

Anonymous, 760 P.2d 916, 919 (Utah App. 1988); People v. Kinder, 122 Cal. App. 2d 457,
265 P.2d 24, 28 (1954). Unfortunately, these "record" references are typical of defendants'
brief.
Regarding the content of the subpoena and Ferrari's supporting declaration,
defendants focus on the immaterial. It is true that the declaration acknowledged Ferrari's
membership in the Utah Bar, that it pertained to a Utah action, and that such
declarations may be signed by out-of-state attorneys. (Br. of Resp. at 11-13.) However,
the deficiency in the declaration, nowhere discussed by defendants, is Ferrari's failure to
disclaim membership in the California Bar. The listing of Ferrari's name with a California
law firm and California address on a California court document signed and notarized in
California naturally carries the impression to the public that Ferrari is a member of the
California Bar. Under the circumstances, a disclaimer of California Bar membership was
necessary to render the document not misleading. (Br. of App. at 16-18.) Defendants
glibly argued to the district court, and repeat in their brief, that Mr. Ferrari did nothing
more nor less than what Mr. Fishier does, or what Judge Moffat has done, in procuring
out-of-state subpoenas. (Br. of Resp. at 13.) The plain difference is that neither Mr.
Fishier nor Judge Moffat ever procured such a subpoena by listing their name with the
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name and address of an out-of-state law firm; in short, they did not create the impression
that they were members of the issuing state's bar.
Defendants attempt to portray McVey's letter to the California Bar as malicious
and misleading. (Br. of Resp. at 14-15.) The contrary is true. McVey sent his letter to
the District Attorney of Santa Barbara County, at the direction of the California State
Bar office, because that is the county in which Ferrari filed his declaration and subpoena.
(McVey Aff t, Br. of App., Add. 30.) He sent a copy to the San Diego Bar Association
because Ferrari was practicing out of a San Diego office. {Id,, Add. 39-40.) Contrary
to defendants' assertion (Br. of Resp. at 14), McVey did enclose a copy of both the
declaration and the subpoena with his letter. (McVey Aff t and Exhibit, Br. of App., Add.
31, 39-40.) Defendants have no sworn evidence to the contrary. Defendants then present
a redundant list of information they claim McVey should have included in his letter. (Br.
of Resp. at 15-16.) However, defendants purposely miss the whole point of the letter.
McVey was not challenging the validity of the subpoena, Ferrari's right to procure a
subpoena, or the manner in which it was procured and issued; rather, McVey's only
purpose in sending the letter was to inform the California Bar that Ferrari was filing and
serving court documents which, on their face, created the false impression to the public
that he was a member of the California Bar. A simple reading of the McVey letter
conveys no more and no less. (Br. of App., Add. 39-40.)
Defendants misrepresent the California response to McVey's letter, citing two
incorrect record references. (Br. of Resp. at 17.) Brian E. Hill, Deputy District Attorney
of Santa Barbara County, initially wrote to Mr. McVey that Ferrari had refuted any

4

impropriety. (Br. of App., Add. 41.) However, that initial response was based on false
statements by Ferrari that are detailed in Brief of Appellant, pages 6-7, including his false
claim that the subpoena was issued pursuant to a filed commission signed by Judge
Moffat. Hill subsequently wrote the following warning to Ferrari:
The State Bar indicates that your use of letterhead for a law office in
California might lead some to believe you are licensed to practice in
California. Although that proposition is arguable, it is not without some
merit. The Bar referred me to Rule l-400(d) of the California Rules of
Court, to which I refer you. [Br. of App., Add. 54.]
Hill then informed Ferrari that he considered the matter closed.

(Id.) Accordingly,

McVey's report was considered to be well grounded. No further support from other
California Bar officials was necessary.
Defendants struggle in the attempt to identify some factual basis for the
disqualification. The sole basis mentioned in the motion to disqualify was McVey's letter
to the California Bar stating that Ferrari "may be engaging in the unauthorized practice
of law in California."

(Motion, Br. of App., Add. 57; McVey letter, id., Add. 39.)

Moreover, McVey's letter was the sole factual basis discussed in the arguments before
Judge Moffat. Judge Moffat considered the letter improper because he misperceived its
purpose. He thought that plaintiffs counsel were challenging the validity of the subpoena,
which would have been a wasted action in view of the fact that Bernstein and his
unprivileged documents had already been produced.
4

4

In fact, the sole purpose of the

The Court: AJlright. Now, is it true that in fact the deposition had been taken without the benefit of the
subpoena?
Mr. Burbidge: We agreed to it.
The Court: Then why all the fuss?
Mr. Burbidge: In what context, Your Honor?
The Court: About the validity of the issuance of the subpoena?
(Cont.)

5

McVey letter was to inform the California Bar that Ferrari's California court documents
created the false impression that he was licensed in California. When plaintiffs counsel
attempted to explain that limited purpose, Judge Moffat responded that McVey had no
obligation to report Ferrari's practice to the California Bar, and that no lawyer should
take that kind of action, regardless of whether it is ethically required or even requested
by the bar.

(Tr. 10/13/89 at 33-34.)

On that faulty basis, Judge Moffat ordered

disqualification. (Id. at 35.)
Realizing the inadequate factual basis for disqualification, defendants now seek to
expand the grounds beyond those considered by Judge Moffat. Defendants now claim that
disqualification was ordered because Brinton Burbidge filed an "intentionally untrue
affidavit" after disqualification was ordered on October 13, 1989. (Br. of Resp. at 17-19,
n.2.) At the October 13 hearing, Mr. Burbidge informed the Court that McVey sent the
letter to the California Bar on his own initiative, at the request of the California Bar. (Tr.
10/13/89 at 13-14.) Mr. McVey's affidavit confirmed that fact. (Br. of App., Add. 3334.) After disqualification was ordered, in support of a motion for reconsideration, Mr.
Burbidge submitted an affidavit, dated October 24, 1989, explaining that he was not aware
of McVey's proposed letter and that the letter was unrelated to the merits of this case.
(R. 2776.) Mr. Ferrari responded with an affidavit, dated October 27, 1989, asserting his
opinion that Mr. Burbidge did know of the proposed letter. (R. 2822.) Defendants now

The Court . . . All your contacts were made for the purpose of determining whether or not the subpoena was
properly issued. . . .
The Court: And then you continued to press forward with this issue, after the question that you were trying to
solve directly was really of no importance . . . . [Tr. 10/13/89 at 16-17 ]

6

accuse Mr. Burbidge of lying in his affidavit because he did not file a second affidavit
disputing Ferrari's affidavit. (Br. of Resp. at 18-19.)
Defendants' whole line of argument is absurd. It is immaterial whether Burbidge
knew or approved of McVey's action. Judge Moffat's ruling did not turn on that factual
issue; Burbidge's affidavit is nowhere mentioned in either hearing before Judge Moffat.
In fact, Judge Moffat, at Mr. Fishler's prompting, declared that motions to reconsider do
not exist under Utah law; that he "made the decision based upon what was before me at
the time" of the October 13 hearing; and that he would not reconsider his decision. (Tr.
10/30/89 at 4.) Accordingly, no post-ruling affidavits were considered by Judge Moffat.
Defendants are simply slinging mud in a desperate effort to defend and indefensible
ruling. 5
On pages 20-22 of their brief, defendants again repeat over and over the supposed
factual grounds for disqualification.

Each supposed ground having been addressed

previously, a mere summary response will suffice at this point.
1.

Finding that McVey's letter was "unfounded": This "finding" has no support

in the record and must, accordingly, be reversed. As demonstrated above and in the Brief
of Appellant, pages 16-20, Ferrari's California legal documents created the false impression
that he was a member of the California Bar; McVey had an obligation to report that fact;

5

Defendants quote Judge Moffat out of context in attempting to expand the scope of his ruling. (Br. of Resp.
at 18 n.2.) When Judge Moffat made the scholarly comment, "that doesn't cut any mustard with me. I just don't buy
that," he was responding to Mr. Burbidge's argument that McVey was justified in following the direction of the California
Bar, not to Burbidge's unrelated denial that he knew of the letter in advance. (See Tr. 10/13/89 at 20.)
Defendants also attempt to characterize Burbidge's settlement overture, following disqualification, as a basis for
disciplinary action. (Br. of Resp. at 17, 19.) However, again, this action was taken after disqualification and was nowhere
mentioned by Judge Moffat as a basis for his ruling. In any event, what is so sinister in trying to settle the case? It is
defendants who should be ashamed of scuttling all efforts at settlement.

7

and California Bar officials concluded that his report was "not without some merit."
Moreover, under the common law rule of absolute privilege, Brief of Appellant at 2629, the truth or falsity of a report of lawyer misconduct is immaterial. Judge Moffat's
ruling that a lawyer has no obligation to report perceived misconduct by other lawyers,
even when requested by bar officials, is patently erroneous as a matter of law.
2.

Judge Moffat's speculation of improper motives for the McVey letter: The

only evidence of Mr. McVey's motive is contained in his affidavit, which states that he sent
the letter out of a genuine sense of obligation as a member of the California Bar. There
is no evidence or finding to the contrary. There is no conceivable benefit that could have
accrued to plaintiff as a result of the letter, and neither Judge Moffat nor defendants have
cited any. Judge Moffat erroneously attributed a bad motive to McVey because he
misperceived the letter as a belated challenge to the subpoena rather than as a valid
report of apparent unauthorized practice. Defendants' suppositions about what Judge
Moffat may have thought about Mr. Burbidge's affidavit and settlement overture are
immaterial, as discussed above.
3.

Loss of credibility of plaintiffs counsel: Judge Moffat never stated or found

that he did not believe plaintiffs counsel; he simply disagreed that the facts as presented
justified McVey's action as a matter of law. Again, defendants' repeated attacks on Mr.
Burbidge's credibility prove nothing but mean-spiritedness because Judge Moffat's ruling
was not based on Burbidge's affidavit.
4.
imagination.

Lack of remorse by plaintiffs counsel: This argument really stretches the
Nothing in the transcript or the order indicates that Judge Moffat
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disqualified plaintiffs counsel for their "lack of remorse" about the McVey letter.
Moreover, Mr. Burbidge never "shouted" in the argument.

He merely expressed

frustration over the irony of his firm being accused of misconduct for reporting the
misconduct of opposing counsel.

It is Mr. Ferrari who should admit wrongdoing in

masquerading as a member of the California Bar while procuring a subpoena without a
properly filed commission.
5.

Court's opinion that the case could be concluded more quickly with new

counsel: Again, this was not a basis for the ruling. If it was, then defendants' counsel
should also be removed so the case could be settled doubly quick. If trial judges were
free to remove any counsel in the belief that other counsel could handle the case better
or faster, the long cherished right to counsel of one's choice would be lost.
B.

Response to Plaintiffs Statement
Next, defendants attempt to discredit plaintiffs statement of facts. Most of their

distinctions, however, are either discussed above, immaterial or misrepresented.

For

example, defendants challenge the accuracy of plaintiffs cited support for Prudential's
harassment of plaintiffs expert, Burt Bernstein.

(Br. of Resp. at 23, 112.) However,

defendants omitted half the citation. (See Br. of App. at 3, n.l.) Defendants attempt
to mitigate their failure to serve plaintiff with a copy of the Bernstein subpoena by
referring to service of the notice of deposition. (Br. of Resp. at 23-24, 113.) However,
service of a deposition notice does not constitute service of a subsequent subpoena.
Regarding the scope of the protective order, which made it unnecessary to challenge the
validity of the subpoena, the order made no provision for obtaining more documents at
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a later date. (Cf. Br. of Resp. at 24, 115 with Protective Order, R. 2197, Br. of App., Add.
49-50.)
Defendants attempt to mitigate their failure to file a commission in the Santa
Barbara County Court as a predicate to issuance of the Bernstein subpoena. They glibly
assert, without any evidence whatsoever, that the commission signed ex parte by Judge
Noel was "obviously" presented to the Santa Barbara Clerk but was "apparently" misfiled
or not filed. (Br. of Resp. at 24 117.) Defendants are "obviously" guessing, or hiding the
truth that Ferrari was able to procure the subpoena without a commission by simply
leading the Santa Barbara Court Clerk to believe that he was a member of the California
Bar. Most likely, Mr. Ferrari chose not to use the commission when he discovered that
it erroneously ordered the deposition of John Murphy, plaintiffs other California expert,
instead of Burt Bernstein, as desired. (See Commission, R. 2575, Br of App., Add. 4445.) Whatever the truth, Mr. Ferrari is not talking. Defendants' counsel succeeded in
turning the tables at the disqualification hearing by persuading Judge Moffat that the
commission had been properly filed in California, despite the facts that they had just
handed him the original, and the Santa Barbara Clerk had certified that it was not on file.
(Tr. 10/13/89 at 21; Br of App, Add. 48.) 6

6

Mr. Fishier represented:
On July 31st, 1989, a subpoena was issued out of the California Court. . . . That was done
after Your Honor issued a commission, allowing for the taking of the deposition . . . . Armed with that
commission, the California Court issued a subpoena, which was duly served. [Tr. 10/13/89 at 3.]
Mr. Ferrari added
Your Honor, [the commission] was filed by the firm of Henderson and Angle in
Santa Barbara [Id at 23 ]

10

Finally, defendants again question the Brian Hill letter, discussed above, arguing
that Rule 1-400, California Rules of Professional Conduct, cited by Mr. Hill, "obviously
had no possible bearing on the Bernstein subpoena." (Br. of Resp. at 25, 117, n.4.) The
California Bar "obviously" disagree. Mr. Hill was informed by the California Bar that
Ferrari's use of a California law firm and address on California legal documents "might
lead some to believe [he is] licensed to practice in California." (Br. of App., Add. 54.)
Rule 1-400(D), as interpreted by the California Bar, prohibits the use of any law firm
name in a manner which tends to confuse or mislead the public, and requires lawyers to
make any disclosure necessary to avoid misleading the public. (See full text of Rule, Br.
of App., Add. 55-56.) Accordingly, Rule 1-400 would preclude Ferrari from procuring the
Bernstein subpoena with documents that could mislead the public by creating the false
impression that he is a member of the California Bar.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This case should be reviewed under a de novo or correction of error standard of
review. The abuse of discretion standard, typically applied in lawyer discipline cases, does
not apply because the challenged report to the California Bar violated no ethical rule and
caused no prejudice to the parties or the proceeding. The district court did not impose
disqualification to remedy any perceived prejudice, but solely to punish plaintiffs counsel
for an act unrelated to the proceeding. The question presented, whether a lawyer is
justified in reporting the apparent misconduct of opposing counsel, is one of law.
Moreover, all evidence related to the disqualification is documentary. Accordingly, this
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Court may review the evidence de novo and decide the case as a matter of law rather
than as a matter of discretion.
Under either standard, the disqualification order must be reversed. Under the
abuse of discretion standard, the test is not whether any reasonable person could rule as
the district court ruled, but whether disqualification was ordered on untenable grounds or
for untenable reasons. Because the order has no adequate factual or legal basis, it was
an abuse of discretion. The order is erroneous as a matter of lav/ because McVey's
report to the California Bar was justified, ethically required, well founded, and absolutely
privileged.
Defendants concede that McVey's letter resulted in no prejudice to the parties, and
they have identified no prejudice to the proceeding. They assert merely that the letter
libeled Mr. Ferrari. Under these circumstances, disqualification in an unrelated matter is
inappropriate, the proper remedy being a complaint to bar officials or an independent
action. Defendants have cited no case, and plaintiff has found none, disqualifying counsel
solely for reporting the apparent misconduct of opposing counsel. Defendants' assertion
that disqualification works no hardship on Mrs. Hardy is plainly without merit.
Defendants do not dispute that McVey's report to the California Bar is absolutely
privileged under the common law. They merely challenge the corresponding privilege
under the disciplinary rules. However, defendants cite no legal or policy grounds not to
apply the privilege in this case. The privilege is necessary to encourage reporting of
lawyer misconduct and to maintain effective self-regulation of the profession.
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Finally, disqualification implicates the due process rights of both plaintiff and her
counsel. Without analysis or citation of authority, defendants term plaintiffs right as
"frivolous" and her counsel's right as "nonexistent." The disqualification order should be
reversed, and the case should be remanded for trial on the merits.
ARGUMENT
POINT I:

THE DISQUALIFICATION ORDER CONSTITUTES REVERSIBLE
ERROR UNDER BOTH ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND CORRECTION
OF ERROR STANDARDS OF REVIEW.

Defendants' arguments I, II, and III all pertain to whether this Court should review
the disqualification order under an abuse of discretion or correction of error standard.
Plaintiff has demonstrated that a de novo or correction of error standard of review is
appropriate under the circumstances of this case. (Br. of App. at 9-12.) However, under
either proposed standard, the disqualification order must be reversed.
A.

Abuse of Discretion
Defendants cite Margulies v. Upchurch, 696 P.2d 1195 (Utah 1985), for the

proposition that disqualification of counsel "may be reviewed only for abuse of discretion."
(Br. of Resp. at 29.) However, Margulies states that a trial court's "discretion extends to
deciding whether disqualification is a proper sanction [only] after a finding of an ethical
violation." 696 P.2d at 1199 (emp. added). In the present case there was no such finding.
Moreover, it is only "that portion of the trial court's order" actually imposing or
withholding the sanction that may be reviewed for abuse of discretion. Id. at 1200.
Review of predicate findings and conclusions requires no deference to the trial court,
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especially where, as here, all evidence is documentary. Id.; see Western Kane County Spec.
Serv. Dist. v. Jackson Cattle Co., 744 P.2d 1376, 1378 (Utah 1987).
The definition or test for abuse of discretion urged by defendants is also faulty.
They cite a federal case dealing with voluntary withdrawal of counsel for the rule that
discretion is abused "only where no reasonable man could agree with the district court."
(Br. of Resp. at 29.) However, no single test for abuse of discretion would apply in all
cases and circumstances, and Utah apparently has never adopted the deferential standard
proposed by defendants. In fact, most states have rejected it. For example, in Coggle v.
Snow, 56 Wash. App. 499, 784 P.2d 554 (1990), the court carefully reviewed the bounds
and standards for judicial discretion and rejected the "reasonable man" approach:
Instead of examining the reasons for the decision, this standard focuses on
the reasonableness of the decision-maker. But to say that an abuse of
discretion exists when "no reasonable man, woman or judge" would have
taken the view adopted by the trial court is not accurate. It cannot justly
be said that every trial judge reversed by the appellate court or Supreme
Court for an abuse of discretion is less reasonable than the reversing judges.
. . . Strict application of such a standard would mean that an appellate
court would never reverse without a hearing to determine the general
reasonableness of the judge. [784 P.2d at 559.]
The court concluded that "[t]he proper standard is whether discretion is exercised on
untenable grounds or for untenable reasons, considering the purposes of the trial court's
discretion." Id. This standard is consistent with Margulies, where this Court reversed an
order denying disqualification, not because no reasonable person could rule as the trial
court ruled, but because the basis for the ruling was untenable under the circumstances.
Applying the foregoing principles to the present case, it is evident that Judge
Moffat abused his discretion. The purpose of his discretion over the conduct of counsel
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is to foster justice by preventing ethical violations that prejudice the opposing party or the
proceeding. He abused his discretion, not because he is unreasonable or because no
reasonable person could rule as he ruled, but because his ruling is based on "untenable"
grounds and reasons. In this case, as noted previously, there was no ethical violation and
there was no prejudice to the parties or the proceeding. Judge Moffat misperceived the
McVey letter as a belated challenge to the subpoena rather than as a dutiful disclosure
to bar officials. His "finding" that the letter was "unfounded" was based on the erroneous
and "untenable" view of the law that attorneys have no obligation to report apparent
misconduct of other attorneys, even when expressly requested by bar officials.

The

reporting of apparent misconduct simply did not justify the extreme sanction of
disqualification under the circumstances of this case. Accordingly, the order must be
reversed.
B.

Correction of Error
Defendants' objections to a correction of error standard have no merit.

For

example, defendants assert that this case does not involve mixed questions of fact and law.
(Br. of Resp. at 30.) However, the questions whether McVey's report to the California
Bar was "unfounded," whether the report was justified under the circumstances, and
whether the report was privileged involve elements of both fact and law. Defendants next
assert that this Court's jurisdiction over discipline of attorneys is not invoked because this
is not a disciplinary matter.

(Id. at 31.) However, where sanctions are imposed for

attorney conduct unrelated to the parties or the proceeding, the sanctions cannot be
considered remedial, but must be regarded as purely punitive. Finally, defendants dispute
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that the disqualification motion was decided on solely documentary evidence. They regard
counsel as witnesses at the disqualification hearing and treat their arguments as testimony.
(Id.) However, as noted previously, counsel at oral argument on a motion do not speak
as witnesses, and their arguments do not constitute evidence. See In re Adoption of Infant
Anonymous, supra, 760 P.2d at 919; People v. Kinder, supra, 265 P.2d at 28. Accordingly,
defendants present no bar to a correction of error standard of review.
Defendants argue that Judge Moffat committed no error in ordering disqualification,
citing cases involving "repeated violations of an order," "wrongdoing," or "protection of the
integrity of the judicial process." (Br. of Resp. at 31-32.) However, this case implicates
none of the above. The McVey letter violated no order or ethical rule and did not
interfere with the judicial process. Mr. McVey was simply complying with his ethical
obligation to report apparent misconduct and with the request of the California Bar, of
which he is a member. Since McVey did nothing to justify disqualification, Judge Moffat's
order is reversible under the correction of error standard.

POINT II: THE REPORTING OF MR. FERRARI'S CONDUCT TO THE
CALIFORNIA BAR WAS LAWFUL AND PROPER.
In their argument IV, defendants assert that McVey's report to the California Bar
justified disqualification because his "accusations were unfounded and made to achieve an
advantage in this case." (Br. of Resp. at 33.) However, as demonstrated in the Brief of
Appellant, pages 19-20, 25-29, a lawyer has an ethical responsibility to report the apparent
misconduct of a fellow lawyer. Such reporting, while at times distasteful, is necessary to
effective self-regulation of the profession.

If lawyers are to be exposed to liability or

sanctions whenever such a report turns out to be "unfounded" or results in no corrective
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action, then reporting of even legitimate charges will cease and self-regulation will become
illusory.

See, e.g., Wiener v. Weintraub, 22 N.Y.2d 330, 239 N.E.2d 540 (1968).

Additionally, under the rule of absolute immunity, the reporting lawyer's personal motives
are immaterial. See, e.g., Bufalino v. Teller, 209 F. Supp. 866, 870 (D. Pa. 1962). In any
event, as discussed previously, the evidence shows that McVey's report was not
"unfounded," as it had basis in both law and fact, and was not made for any improper
purpose.
Defendants also challenge the cases cited by plaintiff, which demonstrate the
impropriety of Ferrari's conduct (Br. of App. at 17-18), asserting that the cases are
"miscited" and have no application to the dispute. (Br. of Resp. at 33-34.) However,
defendants provide no analysis or cases to the contrary. Plaintiff reaffirms to the Court
that the authorities cited provide more than ample legal basis for McVey's report to the
California Bar.
Finally, defendants cite various ethical rules and statutes which they argue were
"clearly" violated by McVey's letter. (Br. of Resp. at 34-36.) However, each provision was
discussed and distinguished in plaintiffs Brief of Appellant, pages 15-16. The district court
found no violation of any of the provisions. Accordingly, no further reply is necessary.
POINT III: CONSIDERATIONS OF RELATIVE PREJUDICE AND HARDSHIP TO
THE PARTIES REQUIRE REVERSAL OF THE DISQUALIFICATION
ORDER.
Defendants' arguments V, VI, and VIII discuss the considerations of prejudice and
hardship to the respective parties.

Plaintiffs Brief of Appellant, pages 20-23,

demonstrated that McVey's report to the California Bar resulted in no prejudice to
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defendants or the proceeding, or even to Mr. Ferrari. Defendants do not dispute the
absence of prejudice to themselves as parties.

They merely assert, in reliance on a

California statute, that McVey libeled Ferrari and that damage to Ferrari is presumed.
(Br. of Resp. at 36.) This response reveals the true objective of the disqualification
motion. It was not to remedy any harm to the parties or the proceeding, but to punish
plaintiffs counsel for Ferrari's personal satisfaction.

Under these circumstances,

disqualification is wholly inappropriate. The job of the district court is to protect the
parties and the proceeding, not to take sides in personal disputes between counsel. If
Ferrari feels libeled, he has a remedy by way of independent action or complaint to the
bar. Disqualification of plaintiffs counsel serves no purpose but to punish Mrs. Hardy.
Regarding prejudice to the proceeding, defendants assert, without support, that the
record reveals "ethical lapses" that "evidently" tainted the litigation. (Br. of Resp. at 37.)
Defendants are straining. To repeat once more, Judge Moffat made no finding of an
ethical violation; neither did he make any finding that the McVey letter to the California
Bar "tainted" this litigation. Moreover, there is no evidence in the record to support any
such finding. Supporting evidence and findings cannot be presumed. See, e.g., Anderson
v. Utah County Bd. of County Commissioners, 589 P.2d 1214, 1216 (Utah 1979)(absence of
necessary finding requires reversal); Tester v. Tester, 123 Ariz. 41, 597 P.2d 194, 198 (App.
1979)(absence of supporting evidence requires reversal). 7
7

The district court's only comments regarding the progress of the proceeding implicated the conduct of counsel
on "both sides." (Tr. 10/13/89 at 32.) The court acknowledged that "in all honesty, this has not been a one-sided matter."
(Tr. 10/30/89 at 11.) In any event, "a poor professional working relationship between counsel" does not justify the sanction
of disqualification. Bodily v. Intermountain Health Care Corp., 649 F. Supp. 468, 472 (D. Utah 1986). Further, if a
problem exists on "both sides," it is not fair to sanction only one side. The relevant point is, the act of reporting a possible
ethical violation to the California Bar in no way undermines the ability of Kirton, McConkie & Poelman to continue its
representation of Mrs. Hardy.
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Finally, defendants argue that there is no evidence of hardship to Mrs. Hardy
resulting from disqualification of her counsel. (Br. of Resp. at 38.) This argument defies
reason. As demonstrated in plaintiffs Brief of Appellant, pages 24-25, and as this Court
acknowledged in Margulies, supra, 696 P.2d at 1205, disqualification of counsel after a
long period of representation certainly imposes hardship on the affected client. This
Court may likewise take judicial notice of the hardship on Mrs. Hardy. See Rule 201,
Utah R. Evid. (judicial notice of facts not subject to reasonable dispute).
POINT IV: THE RULE OF ABSOLUTE PRIVILEGE FOR REPORTS OF LAWYER
MISCONDUCT APPLIES TO THE PRESENT CASE.
Plaintiff demonstrated in her Brief of Appellant, pages 25-29, that McVey's report
of apparent misconduct to the California Bar is absolutely privileged under the Procedures
of Discipline of the Utah State Bar and under the common law. Defendants do not
dispute the common law privilege; they provide no discussion and cite no cases to
challenge application of that privilege to this case. Defendants argue instead, in their
argument VII, that the privilege is not authorized by Rule 8.3(a), Utah Rules of
Professional Conduct. (Br. of Resp. at 37.) The only problem with that argument is that
plaintiff never invoked Rule 8.3 as a basis for immunity, and defendants' citation to
plaintiffs brief for such an argument is erroneous. Rule 8.3 sets forth the ethical duty to
report lawyer misconduct; it has nothing to do with the claimed privilege. (See Br. of
App., Add. 63.)
Next, defendants argue that the privilege is not authorized by Rule VIII(c),
Procedures of Discipline of the Utah State Bar, because the rule applies only to "civil
liability," and McVey lost any privilege by communicating with the Santa Barbara District
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Attorney and the San Diego Bar Association. (Br. of Resp. at 37.) Defendants cite no
authority for these limitations on the rule. Moreover, plaintiff has found no case limiting
the immunity to "civil liability" as opposed to disqualification.

Since "civil liability" is

nowhere defined in the rules, its scope may reasonably extend to disqualification. The
purpose for the immunity applies equally to both results; that is, to prevent retaliation of
any kind for reporting of lawyer misconduct. Defendants should not be permitted to
circumvent that purpose simply by seeking disqualification instead of some other form of
liability. Furthermore, the intended immunity is not defeated by the other communications
because Mr. McVey was following the instructions of the California Bar, and the Santa
Barbara District Attorney and San Diego Bar Association were simply agents for the
California Bar in investigating and preventing the apparent misconduct.
In summary, defendants have failed to demonstrate that absolute immunity, as
authorized by either the disciplinary rules or the common law, should not apply.
POINT V:

DISQUALIFICATION VIOLATES THE DUE PROCESS RIGHTS OF
PLAINTIFF AND HER COUNSEL.

Plaintiff demonstrated in her Brief of Appellant, pages 29-34, that the
disqualification order violated the procedural and substantive due process rights of both
plaintiff and her counsel. In their argument IX, defendants respond only to the violation
of plaintiffs rights.

(Br. of Resp. at 38-41.)

With regard to the rights of counsel,

defendants assert elsewhere, without citation of authority, that counsel's interest "is not an
appropriate issue" on appeal. (Id. at 1.) However, when counsel are sanctioned in the
course of litigation, they acquire an independent interest on appeal for the purpose of
vindicating their own rights and reputations. See Cheng v. GAF Corp., 713 F.2d 886 (2nd
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Cir. 1983); In re Murphy, 560 R2d 326, 332-33 n.10 (8th Cir. 1977); Dietrich Corp. v. King
Resources Co., 596 F.2d 422, 424 (10th Cir. 1979). Accordingly, arguments on behalf of
plaintiffs counsel are appropriate and must be considered.
With regard to plaintiffs substantive right to retain counsel of her own choosing,
defendants simply characterize her claim as "frivolous." They do not bother to provide
analysis or authority. (Br. of Resp. at 38.) On the procedural claims, defendants assert
that no evidentiary hearing is required on a motion for disqualification. (Id. at 39.) While
a hearing may not be required in every case, it should have been granted in this case,
not to hear testimony only from Mrs. Hardy, but from other witnesses as well. Moreover,
under the circumstances, plaintiffs request for a hearing was timely. Finally, regarding the
lack of findings, plaintiffs position is not that the findings should have been "more
detailed" (Br. of Resp. at 40), but that no supporting findings were possible on the
evidence before the court.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, this Court should reverse the disqualification order and
remand the case, again, for trial on the merits.
DATED this /7**^day of October, 1990.
Respectfully submitted,
KIRTON, McCONKIE & POELMAN

By: t ^ l ^ ^ r ^ Pflgt^
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Merrill F. Nelson
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant
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